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1. Introduction 
South Africa is an upper middle-income country with social indicators suggesting living standards closer 
though to those of lower-middle income or even low-income countries. This difference between its economic 
status and social development can largely be ascribed to high levels of material inequality that have left 
inordinately large numbers of people outside the economic mainstream. This implies that the society is highly 
inefficient in converting economic resources into social welfare. As is well known, the cause of this lies mainly 
in the long history of segregation and discrimination that has left a legacy of inequality and poverty and also, 
in more recent decades, low economic growth. 
This paper is part of a larger research project, funded by the African Economic Research Consortium 
(AERC), that looks at poverty in South Africa mainly through the lens of the labour market. In order to 
understand present-day inequalities and how these are reflected in poverty, it is necessary to analyse the main 
forces that generated present socio-economic outcomes. Understanding the factors at work can also 
contribute to an understanding of the constraints on and possibilities for redistribution. Thus this paper acts as 
an introduction for the whole research project.  
The next Section will provide a brief decomposition of possible sources of inequality, before we 
investigate the historical origins of this inequality and trends in inequality and in fiscal incidence in Sections 3 
to 5. Section 6 provides a very brief overview of policy developments and Section 7 of present household 
poverty and labour market inequalities, while Section  8 is the conclusion. 
 
2. Sources of inequality: A decomposition of the sources of material welfare 
It is useful for such an analysis to start with the labour market as the major area of inequality. In terms of the 
labour market, remuneration is determined as the product of employment and wages, i.e. any analysis would 
have to deal with both access to employment, and the remuneration attached to such employment (hereafter 
referred to as wages). 
But not all incomes are from remuneration. Non-remuneration income consists of income from the other 
factors of production (land rent, interest on capital, profits on entrepreneurship) as well as transfer incomes. 
Transfer incomes, because of their origin mainly as social assistance provided by the state, are a special case 
that will better be dealt with as part of fiscal issues. Thus the other sources of non-remuneration income can 
be divided between those that are a return to assets or wealth (land rent and returns to capital), and 
entrepreneurial income. 
Formally, for any racial or other group, or any household,  
Y = Yw + Yn       (eq.1) 
 = W.E + Yn      (eq.2) 
where  
Y refers to the personal incomes,  
Yw to the portion accruing as remuneration incomes, 
Yn to the non-remuneration part of personal income,  
W to average remuneration rates, and 
E to the number of people in formal employment, i.e. receiving remuneration. 
 
Expressed in per capita terms, where population is P: 
 
Y/P = W (E/P) + Yn/P     (eq.3) 
 
Thus shifts in the per capita income of a group, given its population, can be ascribed to one of three 
possible factors: 
· changes in wage levels in the formal economy, 
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· changes in employment relative to population1, and  
· changes in non-remuneration income, mainly income from property or entrepreneurship (e.g. profits, 
dividends, interest receipts, farming income and income from informal businesses), as well as transfers. 
As non-remuneration income is relatively slow to change, shifts in distribution are usually driven by either 
wage shifts or employment shifts, as will be discussed in Section 4.  
Another source of material inequality lies in the fiscal incidence of government activities, both in terms of 
taxation and in terms of public spending, particularly social spending. Discriminatory budgets in South Africa 
have long been a corollary of apartheid and will be dealt with in some detail. 
It is common to assume that welfare is a function of consumption.  
U = f(C)       (eq.4) 
However, welfare can more properly be seen as a function of so-called secondary income (Bromberger 
1982) or command over resources, which is determined as primary or personal income minus direct taxation 
(i.e. disposable income) plus the value of public services consumed, i.e. 
U = U(Ys)  
   = U(Yp – Td + G)      (eq.5) 
where  
Ys = secondary income 
Yp = primary income 
Td = personal income taxes, and 
G = government spending/consumption of government services. 
Many public spending benefits are impossible to assign to households, for instance, defence or police 
spending. The only major spending category that can be assigned with any degree of certainty is social 
spending, where the beneficiaries are in principle determinable. If this course is followed and other public 
expenditures are ignored, equation 2 above becomes 
U = U(Ys)  
    = U(Yp – Td + Gs)     (eq.6) 
where 
Gs = social expenditure2. 
Thus, for any group, material welfare can be regarded as the sum of remuneration plus non-remuneration 
income, minus personal taxes plus social spending, i.e. 
U = U(Yp – Td + Gs) 
=U(Yw + Yn - Td + Gs)    (eq.7) 
where  Yw =  remuneration income, 
Yn = other (non-remuneration) income. 
For any group, remuneration, in turn, is the product of wage and employment (eq.2 above), thus 
U = U(W.E + Yn - Td + Gs)   (eq.8) 
 
If we are interested in welfare of any particular group in per capita terms, the focus should thus be on  
· average wage levels for that group  
· employment per capita 
· non-remuneration income per capita 
                                                             
1 Note that this differs somewhat from the conventional focus on employment and unemployment relative to the 
labour force. In a purely short-term or static analysis, this difference may not seem very pertinent, but it 
emphasises the role of differential labour force participation rates between groups and over time. 
2 As social spending includes social transfers, which are already counted in personal incomes, adjustments should 
be made to avoid double counting, by excluding social transfers from either primary income or social spending.  
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· personal income taxes per capita, and  
· social spending per capita.  
Given this starting point, it is appropriate to analyse the historical origin and trends of these various 
sources of material inequality to better understand present poverty and inequality. This will be done in 
Sections 3 to 5 below. From this analysis it will become clear why the focus in the broader research of which 
this study forms part falls on the labour force and not so much on other sources of inequality. 
 
3. Origins of poverty and inequality in the South African labour market 
Over the last one hundred years, political influences on the South African labour market were characterised 
by a plethora of legislation that was instrumental in maintaining, until the early 1970s, a workforce strictly 
divided on the basis of race3. Though particular economic interests provided the incentives for such labour 
market interventions, economic forces also often highlighted the inappropriateness of a racially constituted 
labour market. While in the early twentieth century the economy seemed to thrive on a divided workforce, 
industrialisation and the need for more skills meant that a segregated labour market would later become a 
hindrance to economic progress.  
 
3.1 The mineral discoveries of the 1860s and 1880s 
The discovery of diamonds in the 1860s and gold in the 1880s transformed South Africa from a closed, 
agrarian economy to one able to start out on a path of industrialisation and establish international economic 
linkages. The mining industry required a large, mass-based workforce. This was accomplished by coaxing 
black peasants to the mines and applying coercive methods such as the Glen Grey Act of 1894, which 
imposed a tax on all Africans who did not enter the mines on a three month contract (Ncube 1985: 14). To 
augment this labour tax, poll and hut taxes were imposed on the African rural population, thus increasing the 
incentive to earn cash on the mines. Through such legislative interventions, the mines came to rely on a cheap 
and steady supply of African labour from the rural areas.  
 
3.2 1910-1922: Union and the origins of a discriminatory labour market 
The Union of South Africa represented a political partnership between English-speaking and Afrikaner whites 
(representing at that time the mining and agricultural interests respectively) and excluded the African majority 
from any formal political expression (Terreblanche & Nattrass 1990:6). This minority government passed a 
series of laws that would deleteriously impact on the smooth functioning of the labour market:  
· The Mines and Works Act essentially reserved skilled jobs on the mines for whites and thereby prevented 
the upward mobility of Africans on the mines.  
· The Black Labour Regulation Act instituted a standard uniform wage rate for African mine workers and 
prevented African workers from breaking their employment contracts. This was buttressed by a provision 
which prevented employers from attracting workers through higher wages (Greenberg 1980:154). 
· The 1913 Land Act forbade Africans from owning land in designated 'white' areas and resigned Africans to 
'reserves' which accounted for 7% (later 13%) of the total land area of South Africa. The Land Act also 
limited the number of African families that could live on white farms, thereby forcing many African 
peasants out of farming and into wage labour.  
                                                             
3 For the purposes of the study, we use the race classification system, where the society is divided into four 
groups, namely African, coloured, Asian and white. African, coloured and Asian individuals are collectively 
referred to here as blacks. 
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· The pass laws curtailed the free flow of African labour and served as an auxiliary weapon in the migrant 
labour system, forcing many workers to take whatever jobs were available, thus weakening their 
bargaining power and trapping many in low-wage sectors such as agriculture and domestic services 
(Ncube 1985:17). 
Securing a steady supply of labour for the mines was the responsibility of the Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association (WNLA), which sought to hire labour from Southern Africa, and the Native Recruiting 
Corporation (NRC), which was set the task of domestic recruitment. This control exercised over the supply of 
mine labour has led to this sector being characterised as an example of a 'collaborative monopsony' wherein 
mining interests colluded to ensure a stable, predictable flow of labour from rural areas to the fast growing 
industry (Marks & Rathbone 1982:88). 
As a result, the labour market in this period was characterised by a growing number of migrant workers. 
Furthermore, an overlap between occupation and race developed, i.e. a racial division of labour, that would 
be carried into other sectors of the economy in the process of industrialisation, and would persist for decades. 
 
3.3 1922-1933: The Pact government’s repressive labour policies 
On the mines, almost equally poor white workers competed with Africans for jobs. Whereas African workers 
usually had a second source of subsistence in tribal agriculture, white mineworkers were more fully 
proletarianised. When the mines in the early 1920s started replacing white workers by lower paid Africans to 
reduce costs in the face of falling mine incomes, it culminated in a bloody conflict between white 
mineworkers and state forces. This 'Rand Revolt' had significant political and economic ramifications. One 
outcome was the passing of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924, that provided a legal framework for 
collective bargaining between workers and management. But by specifically excluding African employees 
from the provisions of this framework, it laid the basis for a racially discriminatory labour market, the legacy of 
which is still present in the labour market today. 
The government response to the strike contributed to an electoral pact between the National and Labour 
Parties, an alliance between Afrikaner nationalists and English-speaking socialists, and played an important part 
in their electoral victory in 1924. Given its constituency of white farmers and white workers, the Pact 
government aimed to improve the position of agriculture, stimulate domestic industry to reduce the 
dominance of mining, improve the position of white workers, and address the poor white problem. Its 
economic policies included five sets of measures that were to have a lasting influence on South African 
economic development for at least half a century:  
· The system of agricultural co-operatives 
· The agricultural marketing boards and the system of controlled marketing this gave rise to 
· Tariff protection to stimulate domestic industry at the expense of imports 
· A major role for the state as industrial entrepreneur through state corporations such as ISCOR 
· Protection of white workers against black competition by the "civilised labour" policy. 
In the industrial sphere, tariff protection remarkably stimulated domestic industry and employment. In the 
five decades following the electoral victory of the Pact government (spanning the Great Depression), 
manufacturing employment expanded tenfold, i.e. at almost 5% per year (SA Statistics 1988: 12.6). As a 
consequence, more black workers were drawn into the urban workforce as unskilled labourers in the growing 
manufacturing industry. African manufacturing employment grew by one-third from 46 813 in 1916 to 69 830 
in 1928, rising from 35% to 43% of total manufacturing employment. (South Africa, 1960) 
Yet industrial expansion behind tariff barriers was combined with repressive labour measures that ensured 
that the fruits of this growth were inequitably distributed. The 1925 Wage Act extended the ‘civilised labour 
policy’ by further protecting remuneration to whites and ensuring a minimum wage payable to white 
employees (Saldru 1989). This policy also included job reservation that confined certain skilled occupations to 
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whites, excluded Africans from the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act, and offered tariff protection 
only to those domestic industries employing a large enough proportion of "civilised" workers. The 1926 Mines 
and Works Act further entrenched job reservation on the mines by excluding Africans from all skilled and 
semi-skilled positions on the mines (Ncube 1985:38). For ‘poor whites’, the state provided sheltered 
employment in the newly formed parastatals or on the national public works programme. 
The effect of these measures was reflected in relative wage movements. After 1924, the relative power of 
white mineworkers enabled them to increase their wages steadily and far in excess of the inflation rate. In 
contrast, the mines, constrained by a fixed gold price, a fixed exchange rate and limited possibilities for 
technological or productivity improvement, persisted in paying very low wages for African mineworkers, who 
had little economic power and were excluded from skilled jobs. Consequently, in 1970 the average African 
mineworker’s real wage was no greater than in 1890. Thus the racial wage gap in mining kept on widening 
from 1924 to 1970.  
Even within this hostile environment, some black workers did manage to organise themselves formally. 
The most visible expression of the black trade union movement in this period was the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union (I.C.U.) that came to the fore in the 1920s under Clements Kadalie and at its 
height boasted 100 000 members, primarily farm workers (Stadler 1987:144). The state and employers 
refused to recognise the union and the SA Trade Union Congress, the biggest trade-union federation at the 
time, denied membership to the ICU. Under the strain of high expectations of employees, rising corruption 
and internal disputes, the ICU had dissolved by the early 1930s. 
 
3.4 1933-1948: An easing of labour market segregation 
The Great Depression was ended in South Africa by the movement off the Gold Standard in 1933 and the 
devaluation of the South African pound. The growth of manufacturing continued in this era, stimulated by the 
isolation of World War II and attempts to produce for the war effort. In the period 1940 -1946, gross 
manufacturing output rose by 51% and for the first time surpassed that of agriculture, though still falling 
behind mining.  
The expansion of manufacturing generated a renewed impetus for urbanisation. African urbanisation had 
been managed since the Stallard Commission of 1922. Stallardism advocated the spatial separation of races, 
where Africans would reside in rural areas and only work in urban areas when required by whites. The 
strategy placed legislative controls on the movement of African labour into the cities via influx control, and 
secondly, for those African workers who did reside in urban areas, there was scant provision of housing and 
services. The Stallard principle is best encapsulated in the well known phrase, that Africans in urban areas 
were required to: 
"’..minister to the needs of the white man and should depart therefrom when (they) had ceased so 
to minister.’" (Stadler 1987:88) 
By the 1940s, urbanisation was becoming increasingly difficult to control. The African urbanisation rate 
increased from 12.6% in 1911 to 23.7% in 1946. The Fagan Commission, appointed in 1946 to investigate 
urbanisation, concluded that African urbanisation should be viewed as a natural outcome of industrialisation 
that should be regulated but not prevented (Terreblanche & Nattrass 1990:11). It recommended 
improvements in housing provision, a common identity document for all races, and in the long term the 
possibility of non-racial urban areas.  
Gradual upward mobility of blacks into semi-skilled occupations slowly narrowed the inter-racial wage gap 
in manufacturing in this period, as Table 1 shows. While the average African wage in manufacturing and 
construction was less than 20% of the level of the white wage in 1939/40, before the end of World War II 
this had risen to 24%, despite the fact that white wages also rose steadily. Real wages for African workers 
increased by almost 68% from 1929 to 1945, compared to a 37% increase for white workers. 
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Table 1: Average real wages in manufacturing and construction by race (in 1970 Rand per worker) 
Year White African Wage ratio 
(African as % of white level) 
1929/30 R1 258 R247 19.6% 
1935/36 R1 413 R263 18.6% 
1939/40 R1 418 R278 19.6% 
1944/45 R1 726 R414 24.0% 
  Source: Lipton 1986:409 
 
The black trade union movement was revived in this era. For example, the Council of Non-European Trade 
Unions came to the fore, and in 1941, the African Mine Workers Union (AMWU) was formed (Webster 
1986:16). The growing militancy of black miners led to the 1946 black miners' strike that affected almost half 
of the mines, stopped production on at least twelve mines and involved approximately 76 000 workers 
(Greenberg 1980:157). As a consequence, the number of workdays lost in production rose dramatically from 
91 180 in 1945, to 209 350 in 1946 and to 1 378 063 the following year. Although the strike was eventually 
squashed by the government, it represented the first serious challenge by black workers to the existing 
industrial relations system and to wages and working conditions in mining. 
Other reforms mooted in this period included the abolition of the pass system and the recognition of 
African trade unions. In concurring with the Fagan Commission, the Department of Native Affairs suggested 
that influx control be abolished. To this end regulations on the flow of African labour were relaxed and the 
number of prosecutions for pass law violations fell (Lipton 1986: 22).  
The recommendations of the Fagan Commission meant that Africans would be competing for the same 
jobs as poor whites and would be able to undercut unskilled white workers. Occupational mobility of Africans 
in the manufacturing sector also increased pressures on whites in semi-skilled occupations. Together with the 
spectre of a large organised black workforce manifest in the strike of 1946, this exacerbated existing tensions 
between Afrikaner nationalists and the ruling United Party. The 1948 election was won by a Nationalist Party 
that was able to appeal to the economic fears and nationalist sentiments of Afrikaners under the banner of 
apartheid. The marginal gains attained in the labour market under Smuts’s United Party, were to be viciously 
reversed in the subsequent period. 
 
3.5 1948-1973: The apartheid labour market 
Political apartheid became institutionalised after 1948 and eventually operated at three levels. At the macro 
level, "grand apartheid" tried to create black nation-states and to give these economic content by 
development of the homelands and the policy of industrial decentralisation. At the intermediate or meso level, 
apartheid emphasised separation between race groups ("own community life") through influx control, urban 
settlement patterns (Group Areas), population removals, separate schools, and so on. At the micro level, 
"petty apartheid" emphasised separation between individuals of different race groups through separate 
amenities (e.g. parks, sports fields, etc.), prohibition of interracial marriages and sexual relations, etc. While 
macro level apartheid was fiscally the most costly, meso level apartheid measures probably had a greater 
detrimental economic impact through their labour market effects. As long as the economy was still relatively 
underdeveloped, inward looking and expanding rapidly, the costs of these measures could be borne with 
ease, but these costs grew with time, especially once the economic boom of the 1960s had ended. 
The government aggressively promoted the employment of whites in state controlled enterprises and in 
the burgeoning bureaucracy, revitalised public relief programmes to ensure short term employment for 
whites, gave assistance to Afrikaner business, and supported commercial (white) agriculture through a variety 
of measures. 
The onslaught on the black population is now well documented, and it is here only necessary to discuss 
briefly some of the policies that specifically affected the labour market. One of the first actions of the new 
government was to overturn the Fagan Report. The Sauer Commission witnessed a reversion to the Stallard 
THE PRESENT AS A LEGACY OF THE PAST: THE LABOUR MARKET, INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN SA 
 
 
 
  
 
7 
 
 
principle of labour control (Lipton 1986:22). Indeed, a striking feature of this period was the energy put into 
reaffirming and tightening up influx control. Labour Bureaux were established, through the 1968 Bantu Labour 
Regulation Act, to control the movement of such labour. Pass law related arrests reached 700 000 in 1968 
(Lipton 1986:35), which constituted approximately one arrest for every twenty economically active Africans. 
Although the National Party altered influx control and increased its complexity, it was essentially a reversion to 
past policies. But as South Africa was by then a much more industrialised country than when Stallardism was 
first imposed, it was much more in conflict with labour market needs.  
The Bantu Labour (Settlements of Disputes) Act of 1953 tightened the exclusion of Africans from the 
industrial relations system by barring African workers from registered unions and forbidding strikes by African 
employees (Greenberg 1980:160). Instead African workers were provided a separate system of 'works' and 
'liaison' committees within which management and African workers were meant to negotiate terms of 
employment (Lipton 1986:27).  
The upward mobility of black workers was halted by a series of complementary legislation. The Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1956, for example, assured the maintenance of the racial division of labour and 
significantly widened the ambit of the 'civilised labour ' policy to all sectors. In reaction to employer resistance, 
a 1959 amendment to the Act assured that the state could overrule an Industrial Council agreement, thus 
giving the state almost complete control over the hiring practices of private sector employers. White workers 
were given preference in the public sector and in many cases black labour was substituted by white labour 
(Lipton 1986:24). In government services, for example, African employment fell by 12% between 1946 and 
1951. 
As an auxiliary to job reservation, the 1953 Bantu Education Act required that African education be largely 
self-funded, thus tying expenditure on African education to revenue earned in the form of taxes from Africans 
(Bromberger 1982). In the early years of National Party rule, expenditure on African education fell in per 
capita terms, and it declined from 13% of white levels in 1953 to only 10% in 1961 (SAIRR 1961).  
Thus African school-leavers entered the labour market at a severe disadvantage. At the point of entry to 
jobs, further discrimination was evident in the form of a 'civilised labour' policy that gave first preference to 
white workers. If Africans were able to gain entry into a job their mobility was curtailed and their bargaining 
power reduced through constraints on trade union activity. Thus from pre-employment to employment, 
African workers faced legislation that sought to undermine their ability to accumulate human capital, to 
increase their wages, to gather relevant job experience, and to negotiate for better wages and working 
conditions.  
While industrial expansion during the Second World War had improved the relative wage of blacks, the 
end of the war and National Party rule shifted economic power back to white workers. Thus the African to 
white wage ratio returned to its pre-war level by 1960. In the high-growth era of the 1960s, it was even to 
deteriorate somewhat (as shown later in Table 2b), as whites were the main beneficiaries of the expanding 
need for skills created by the economic boom.  
In the midst of these dramatic changes, the South African economy experienced a decade of 
unprecedented growth. Economic growth in the period 1961 to 1970 exceeded 5%. Large capital inflows, a 
high gold price and abundant cheap labour sustained these golden years of the apartheid economy.  
The boom period created a greater demand for skilled labour, thus the state resorted to encouraging 
immigration, upgrading the skills of employed whites and also enticing women into the labour market (Lipton 
1986: 33-34). It nevertheless became increasingly difficult to rely solely on a small base of white employees. 
The state responded by allowing the colour bar to become de facto a 'floating bar'. This involved the 
reclassification of jobs to allow blacks to be trained in the less skilled components of 'white jobs'. Racial 
divisions were still strictly adhered to, as no black worker could supervise a white employee (Lipton 1986:33). 
In addition, skilled work for blacks was limited, particularly where it competed with whites. The mobility 
allowed by the government was constrained as it sought to maintain the rigid overlap between race and 
occupation (Lipton 1986:33).  
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Thus the windfall economic gains of the 1960s heightened the tension between legislative provisions in 
the labour market and the economy's need for a wider skills base. The state's response was an attempt to 
institute concessions within the broader realm of an apartheid labour market, an approach whose bankruptcy 
was to become more apparent in the following two decades. 
 
3.6 1973-1990: The origins of the post-apartheid labour market 
The first oil shock began an era of prolonged recession and a structural crisis from which the South African 
economy is still trying to recover. Economic growth rates were below population growth for most of this 
period, and per capita income declined by 15% from 1974 to 1993.  
Politically, during this period the National Party resorted to increasingly desperate measures to maintain 
power as resistance to apartheid grew. Its policy responses vacillated between oppression and reform, as 
reflected in, e.g., the 'total onslaught' strategy, half-hearted attempts at political reform as encapsulated in the 
tricameral parliament, and more fundamental labour and urbanisation policy reforms (discussed below). 
Explosive examples of the clash between oppression and resistance include the 1976 Soweto uprising and 
numerous struggles by communities in the 1980s. Faced with a chronic crisis, a hostile international 
community and the obvious anachronism of apartheid, political reforms ensued in 1990, resulting in a 
democratically elected government in April 1994. 
In the labour market, perhaps the most important events of this period were the 1973 wild cat strikes, 
which were as spontaneous as they were widespread. It forced both government and employers to rethink 
their industrial relations strategies. Their responses were embodied in the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions 
of 1979.  
The Wiehahn Commission recommended the legalisation of black trade unions and the scrapping of job 
reservation. This led to the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979, which widened the definition of 
an employee to include African workers, although migrant workers initially remained excluded and the Act 
still barred non-racial trade unions (this provision was to be omitted two years later) (Saldru 1991). Notably 
also, agricultural and domestic workers remained excluded from the ambit of the 1979 Act. One of the results 
of these reforms was a more than threefold growth in trade union membership, from 701 758 in 1979 to 2 
458 712 in 1990. Thus the upshot of the Wiehahn Commission was a black workforce with greater 
bargaining power and increasingly drawn into the regulated labour market, where they were now covered by 
legislation on minimum conditions of employment. 
The Riekert Commission investigated the issue of African labour mobility. It argued for the relaxation of 
controls on workers who held rights of urban residence or employment, to allow for a freer flow of labour to 
the cities. Given the mining industry's increased reliance on local labour and pressure from the manufacturing 
industry for a stable workforce, influx control was abolished in 1986. This eradicated one of the last pillars of 
the apartheid labour market. 
 
 
3.6.1. Wage and income inequality 
Between the Second World War and the late 1960s, African wages across all sectors had remained fairly 
stagnant. However, from the 1970s onwards, wages rose rapidly for all groups but whites. Indeed, this rise in 
wages is considered to be one of the most important factors explaining the change in income distribution 
patterns over the last twenty years, and its cause can to a large extent be found in an important shift in relative 
economic power. 
In mining, there was a dramatic turnaround in trends in the racial wage gap, which had widened 
consistently until the early 1970s, but then started narrowing from both sides as African real wages rose 
startlingly in the 1970s, while white wages often lagged behind inflation (Table 2a). Black wages in mining 
were only 6% of white wages in 1960, but by 1985 this figure had risen to 19% (Table 2b). Indeed, from 
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1972 to 1980, mean African wages in mining increased almost threefold (by 184%). In manufacturing and 
construction, too, the wage gap narrowed considerably, if not as spectacularly. The major causes of these 
changing wage trends of the 1970s and beyond were the increased bargaining power of particularly African 
workers, their access to higher occupational levels due to the growth of the skills scarcity in the 1960s, and 
rising educational levels.  
 
Table 2a:  Real growth of wages of whites and Africans by industry/sector, 1945-93 (% p.a.) 
Sector Race 1945-60 1960-72 1972-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-93 
Manufacturing Whites 3,05 3,35 0,92 1,16 0,08 -0,80 
  Africans 0,44 2,57 7,57 3,62 1,59 1,21 
Construction Whites 1,89 4,18 -1,63 1,42 -0,56 -2,68 
  Africans 0,07 3,38 6,07 -0,38 2,16 -2,67 
Mining* Whites 2,35 2,48 4,44 -1,59 0,36  
 Africans 0,31 1,32 29,59 5,44 3,12  
 All races 1,57 1,51 15,74 2,51 1,65 1,17 
Formal sector* Whites   0,83 -0,79 1,79  
  Africans   10,47 3,29 2,88  
 All races   2,42 0,75 1,75 1.38 
Non-primary Whites    -0,74 1,22 -0,28 
 Sectors Africans    2.85 2,28 3,12 
 All races    0,58 1,76  1,26 
* The 1980-85 period is replaced by 1980-84 for the White and African groups as a racial breakdown was not provided 
after 1984. 
 Source: Hofmeyr 1999, Table 2 
 
Table 2b: Real growth of black wages and black: white wage gap by industry, 1960-94 
 Mining Manufac-
turing 
Con-
struction 
Annual growth of real black wage:    
1961-70 0.72% 2.69% 2.96% 
1971-80 13.18% 4.61% 2.83% 
1981-85 -0.14% 0.81% 1.15% 
1985-94 .. 1.21% -0.29% 
Black wages as % of white levels:    
1960 6% 19% 18% 
1970 5% 17% 15% 
1980 17% 23% 19% 
1985 19% 25% 21% 
1994 .. 29% 30% 
Source: Fallon 1992, SA Labour Statistics 1995 
 
Econometric investigation confirm that higher levels of education and training amongst blacks, a decline in 
wage discrimination and the rise of powerful black trade unions had all contributed to this rise in black wages 
in the 1970s (Hofmeyr 1990). As Tables 3a and 3b illustrate, greater occupational mobility amongst African 
workers was evident in the labour market. Hence, in all occupations from manager to semi-skilled manual 
workers, African workers' representation improved from 1969 to 1977. Though definitional differences make 
Tables 3a and 3b not strictly comparable, it is also clear that this major shift in the occupational distribution of 
the African population has continued, as is evident by comparing, e.g., the 40% in elementary occupations in 
1995 with the 71% in manual unskilled occupations in 1969 and the 62% in 1977. 
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Table 3a: Share of white and African employment by occupation, 1969 & 1977 
 White 1969 White 1977 African 1969 African 
1977 
Managers 8.22% 11.28% 0.39% 0.46% 
Professional/semi-professional 10.11% 11.52% 1.89% 2.53% 
Clerical, white collar 42.74% 43.29% 6.29% 9.17% 
Supervisors 4.71% 5.24% 0.48% 1.15% 
Skilled manual 22.98% 22.72% 2.86% 4.97% 
Semi-skilled manual 8.68% 4.91% 16.73% 19.67% 
Unskilled manual 2.56% 1.06% 71.37% 62.04% 
Total economically active 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Due to rounding, figures may not all add up to exactly 100% 
Source: Simkins & Hindson 1979 
 
Table 3b: Share of white and African employment by occupation, 1995 
 Whites Africans 
Legislators, senior officials, managers 14.62% 2.91% 
Professionals 8.41% 2.00% 
Technicians, related professionals 18.51% 9.65% 
Clerks 22.52% 7.84% 
Services, shop & market sales 10.57% 11.18% 
Skilled agriculture & fisheries 3.58% 0.65% 
Craft, related trades 14.97% 10.22% 
Plant, machine operators & assemblers 3.84% 14.04% 
Armed forces 1.64% 40.08% 
Elementary occupations 0.17% 0.22% 
Occupation unspecified, unknown 1.21% 1.18% 
Total economically active 100% 100% 
Due to rounding, figures may not all add up to exactly 100% 
Source: South Africa 1996a. 
 
The anachronism of a racially divided labour market constructed by specific legislative interventions had thus 
become clear from the 1970s onwards. The urgency of promoting economic growth dictated the need to 
allow for occupational mobility and increased wages for black workers. In a sense, continued economic 
stagnation provided proof of the limitations of racist labour market provisions. Thus the labour market began 
to reveal a perceptible alteration from the rigid racial division of labour that had existed in the past. 
Increasingly, the overlap between race and occupation was blurring. 
 
3.6.2. A segmented labour market 
What is clear from the above is that the numerous obstacles faced by black workers in the labour market 
began to be eroded in this period. Hence black workers were given the right to organise in trade unions, real 
wages rose rapidly and occupational mobility was evident. However, these positive developments were 
counterpoised by growing unemployment in an environment of poor economic growth rates. The corollary of 
South Africa's economic stagnation has been unemployment. Over the years this unemployment has come to 
manifest as structural in nature. Rising unemployment was a result not only of inadequate economic growth 
but also of the relative costs of capital and labour. Apart from union action, state policy also contributed to 
making it cheaper to use capital. Such policies included negative real interest rates for a long period, tax 
concessions on capital equipment and an overvalued exchange rate. 
Between 1976 and 1990 the number of those without formal sector jobs increased by 32%. By 1994, 
about half of the economically active population were unable to find formal sector employment. Indeed, 
employment growth had remained below labour force growth for almost all of the past quarter of a century. 
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Growing unemployment translates into a higher incidence of poverty and general social degradation amongst 
the affected groups. 
In order to better appreciate the effect of the poor performance of the economy on the composition of 
employment and its impact on income distribution, it is useful to decompose the South African labour force 
into three groups according to their access to the modern consumer economy:  
· Those employed in the core consumer economy, consisting of the dominant high-wage modern sectors 
manufacturing, government service, and other industry and services. Mining is for present purposes not 
included in this sector.  
· Those employed in the marginal modern sectors. In this group we include the two low-wage sectors of 
commercial agriculture and domestic service, as well as mining. Although mining is not any longer a low 
wage sector, many mining workers are only tenuously linked to the modern economy, as the dependants 
of single migrants residing in mine compounds do not fully participate in modern consumer society. 
· The peripheral labour force, whose existence signifies substantial job scarcity in the formal sectors. In this 
group we include subsistence agriculture, the informal sector, and the unemployed. 
Many households, of course, have more than one earner, and earners may fall in different sectors. 
Nevertheless, even for households this division is pertinent. The sharp wage rises for Africans in the modern 
sectors since the early 1970s have sharply reduced poverty wages amongst most workers in the core modern 
sectors and reduced poverty amongst households dependent on their earnings, though there is still much 
poverty in households mainly dependent on the modern marginal sectors. Poverty in its most extreme form is 
most widespread in the peripheral sectors, where most potential earners are jobless or under-employed.  
 
Table 4: Decomposition of the labour force into sectors by access to modern consumer economy 
 1960 1970 1985 1994 
Core economy 29% 46% 40% 35% 
(manufacturing, government, other industry and services) 
Modern marginal sectors  47% 32% 20% 15% 
(commercial agricultural, domestic service, mining) 
Peripheral labour force  24% 22% 40% 50% 
(subsistence agriculture, informal sector, unemployed) 
Source: Calculations based on: Van der Berg 1987; South African Labour Statistics (various years). Sadie’s relatively 
high labour force estimates (Sadie 1991) were used, thus leading to a larger peripheral sector than observed by the 
OHS1995.  
 
By 1994, the core modern economy contained about 35% of the labour force, and the marginal modern 
economy about 15%, thus leaving about half the labour force (liberally estimated) without formal 
employment. As can be seen from Table 4, the share of the core is decreasing. Instead of expanding rapidly 
so as to draw increasing proportions into the mainstream consumer society, employment in the core 
economy is virtually stagnant. The only growing component in the last decades has been the public sector, 
whilst all three components of the marginal modern economy are shrinking. The brunt of the increase in the 
labour force thus falls upon the peripheral sectors, the unemployed, subsistence agriculture, and the informal 
sector - precisely those sectors experiencing most poverty. Growth of employment in the core economy is 
crucially affected by the overall growth rate in the economy, and the scope for a further reduction in poverty 
is largely determined by the ability of the core economy to create more jobs. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This Section has shown how the history of the South African labour market was forged by the interaction 
between political agendas and economic needs. As the economy developed, the state insisted on promoting 
and protecting white workers at the expense of both black workers and longer term economic interests. This 
DPRU WORKING PAPER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
contradiction was most starkly revealed in the period from the 1970s onwards, and only after one and a half 
decades of abysmal economic performance did the state seek to break from the past. In doing so it 
overturned the last vestiges of legislated racism in the labour market, strengthening market forces that had 
already sharply reduced labour market discrimination despite the effects of legislation.  
We shall now turn to trends in income inequality to show how labour market trends mapped onto 
changes in society-wide inequality. 
 
4. Trends in income inequality  
 
4.1 Wages 
Wage trends have largely already been discussed in Section 3 above, as part of the history of the South 
African labour market. As became apparent, unequal job access was historically a major source of racial wage 
inequality. Before its abolition, job reservation affected job access of generations of blacks and it will long 
have a residual effect. Though job reservation no longer applies, unofficial discrimination and cultural barriers 
still make it difficult for blacks to compete on an equal footing in the job market. Affirmative action policies 
attempting to overcome the effect of these barriers, on the other hand, may become a new source of 
inefficiency in the labour market. 
The superior occupational profile of the white South African labour force when compared even to 
industrial countries can be ascribed to white upward job mobility far beyond their capacity, especially in the 
1970s. "The adjustment to the scarcity of (high-level manpower) has been a dilution of skill requirements" (Sadie 
1982:28) (also refer again to Table 3). Job reservation and inadequate education and training of blacks 
contributed greatly to artificially rapid white occupational mobility. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the 
pattern of wage discrimination changed from the 1970s. Within a given job grade and standardising for 
gender differentials, racial wage differentials have declined considerably since the mid-seventies, as shown in 
Table 5, i.e. the "rate for the job" is increasingly applied (though this says nothing about differential access to 
particular jobs). As early as 1989, African wages were barely 15 per cent lower than those of whites in a 
similar job grade and of the same gender, a substantial reduction in discrimination since the 43 per cent 
differential of 1976, and this had occurred before the apartheid era had formally come to an end. Using other 
data sources, Moll (1998:1 & Table 10) came to a similar conclusion: total discrimination fell from 20% of the 
African wage in 1980 to 12% in 1993.  
 
Table 5: Relative wage levels by race for similar gender and job grade (% of white levels) 
 White Coloured Indian African 
1976 100% 62.2% 67.0% 57.1% 
1985 100% 78.8% 87.3% 78.2% 
1989 100% 79.9% 89.4% 84.7% 
Source: McGrath 1990:97 
 
4.2 Non-remuneration income 
As indicated in Section 2, non-remuneration income consists of income from non-labour factors of production 
(capital, land, entrepreneurship) and from transfers. As social security transfers are best discussed as part of 
fiscal distribution, we shall confine ourselves in this section to a brief analysis of the other sources of income 
mentioned. For convenience, we may think of such income as being returns to wealth (capital, land) and 
returns to entrepreneurship. 
Naturally, the poor are not able to accumulate wealth to the same extent as the rich, therefore wealth - 
and thus by implication also the returns to wealth - is more concentrated than is income. This is readily 
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apparent from the fact that wealth derives from postponed consumption, and the very poor can hardly 
postpone consumption. This can be illustrated from the simple Keynesian consumption function of the form 
C = Ca + cY        (eq.9) 
where  
C = consumption 
Ca = autonomous consumption, i.e. that part of consumption that takes places even when there is 
no income in the period concerned 
c = the marginal propensity to consume, and 
Y = income. 
 
If income can be either consumed or saved, it follows that 
 S = -Ca + (1-c)Y       (eq.10) 
where ........................................................................................................................................................................................ S = savings 
If indeed autonomous savings are negative (–Ca), it follows that the average propensity to save (S/Y) rises 
with the level of income. Thus it is not unexpected that wealth (accumulated savings) is more concentrated 
than income. 
The above analysis of course applies in the short term. In the long term, changes in income over time and 
inter-generational transfers also become important. In South Africa, however, accumulation of assets was 
hardly possible for the majority of the African population in the heyday of apartheid. Moreover, the one 
important asset in African hands, communal land, was not marketable and did not generate much by way of 
returns to wealth. 
Economic theory is not yet able to tell us much about the origins and diffusion of entrepreneurship. What 
is known, however, is that lack of education, of exposure to the modern consumer economy and modern 
technology, and the lack of access to entrepreneurial credit (due inter alia to the fact that communal land 
could not serve as collateral on loans) prevented Africans from participating in the modern economy as 
entrepreneurs perhaps as much as did direct restrictions on business activity. The combined effect was to 
leave African income from entrepreneurship at relatively low levels, despite more recent growth of the 
informal sector. Similar, but somewhat less stringent constraints also inhibited coloured and Indian 
entrepreneurial activity and accumulation of assets. 
Thus non-remuneration income is more concentrated than income from remuneration, and is also likely to 
follow rather than to lead racial shifts in the latter. For this reason, we shall largely confine our analysis to 
remuneration income in this paper, and indeed for the rest of this research project. However, before leaving 
the labour market to hold full sway as the major source of inequality of income and source of poverty in 
South Africa, it is still necessary to provide a summary of the levels and trends of inter-group income inequality 
and then to analyse that part of material control over resources which does not come through the market, i.e. 
social spending, which is done in Section 5 on fiscal incidence.  
 
4.3 Income inequality 
Changing wage gaps do not in full measure lead to changes in the income gap, as wage income (the major 
source of income) is the result of the interaction of wages and employment opportunities relative to 
population. Whilst changing wage levels are important, other determinants of employment relative to 
population also play a role in per capita incomes, such as changing age structure, labour force participation 
rates, and the availability and distribution of employment. Table 6 shows estimates mainly based on various 
surveys since 1917 of the per capita income of the different race groups. Due to the variety of 
income/expenditure concepts used and the data deficiencies inherent in all the surveys, these figures should 
not be interpreted too finely. In particular, the October Household Survey/Income and Expenditure Survey 
(OHS/IES) of 1995 may have overestimated per capita African incomes through inadequately capturing some 
of the poorest segments amongst Africans.  
Nevertheless, despite these provisos, it is still possible to draw some broad conclusions as to movements 
in per capita income from these data. In the first place, the mean per capita income of the poorest group – 
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Africans – reached the poverty line around 1970 and has doubled since, but even today many members of 
this group are still in poverty, as will be discussed later. In the high-growth 1960s the African/white income 
gap actually increased, because skills scarcity, exacerbated by the industrial colour bar, led to a premium 
being paid on the wages of relatively skilled white workers. In the early 1970s, the shift in economic power 
and to a lesser degree changing skill profiles narrowed the wage gap and thereby the income gap. Thereafter, 
the impact on the income gap of the continued narrowing of the wage gap was partly counteracted by 
growing unemployment amongst those with the least skills and education.4 Economic growth best translates 
into a reduction of the inter-group income gap when the racial wage gap narrows and there is sufficient 
growth of employment.  
 
Table 6: A compilation of estimates of per capita personal income by race group in 1995-Rand and relative to 
white levels, 1917-1995 
 White Coloured Indian African Average 
Per capita income in constant 1995-rand: 
1917 R9 369  R2 061  R2 075  R849  R2 829  
1924 R9 931  R1 986  R1 931  R788  R2 966  
1936 R13 773  R2 151  R3 185  R1 048  R3 842  
1946 R18 820  R3 068  R4 328  R1 671  R5 417  
1956 R21 861  R3 698  R4 780  R1 883  R6 123  
1959 R22 683  R3 568  R3 876  R1 746  R6 061  
1960 R22 389  R3 568  R3 828  R1 815  R6 006  
1970 R32 799  R5 684  R6 630  R2 246  R7 986  
1975 R35 757  R6 945  R9 095  R3 075  R9 102  
1980 R34 655  R6 623  R8 821  R2 931  R8 472  
1987 R32 854  R6 862  R9 910  R2 781  R7 643  
1993 R33 326  R6 445  R14 006  R3 637  R8 013  
1995 R34 689  R6 931  R16 793  R4 678  R9 013  
Relative per capita personal incomes (% of white level): 
1917 100 22.0 22.1 9.1  
1924 100 20.0 19.4 7.9  
1936 100 15.6 23.1 7.6  
1946 100 16.3 23.0 8.9  
1956 100 16.9 21.9 8.6  
1959 100 15.7 17.1 7.7  
1960 100 15.9 17.1 8.1  
1970 100 17.3 20.2 6.8  
1975 100 19.4 25.4 8.6  
1980 100 19.1 25.5 8.5  
1987 100 20.9 30.2 8.5  
1993 100 19.3 42.0 10.9  
1995 100 20.0 48.4 13.5  
Source: Own estimates based on McGrath 1983, official national accounts data, 1993 PSLSD, and 1995 OHS/IES.  
 
The major recent distributional trends are the gradual narrowing of the African/white income gap concurrent 
with the widening income gap among Africans, mainly due to differential access to formal employment. While 
some benefited from a doubling of their real wages in the past two decades, unemployment, which affects 
mainly the poorly educated, has also increased. Unemployment and therefore also income inequality have 
strong geographic dimensions, with insiders being largely urban and outsiders rural. A strong rise in the 
income of Indians has improved their position considerably, but due to their small numbers they play a minor 
role in the broader picture of inequality in South Africa. 
 
                                                             
4 The narrowing income gap indicated by the last surveys may in part be the result of a better capturing of non-
formal incomes in the two most recent surveys, and the already mentioned deficiencies of the 1995 OHS/IES. 
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5. Fiscal incidence and differential social spending 
In South Africa, fiscal incidence studies have naturally focused on the racial incidence of taxation and more 
particularly of public spending. Until recently blacks have paid a small portion of overall taxation and the focus 
of fiscal incidence studies fell mainly on determining the extent of racial inequality in public expenditure 
amongst race groups.  
Fiscal incidence studies commonly depart from the notion of equity of the net gains and the losses from 
public expenditure and taxation to gauge the political and policy priorities of a government. Our concern is 
more specifically with equity in the post-fiscal distribution, i.e. with material outcomes of all economic 
processes, of which the budget is but one, as a household's welfare in terms of command over goods and 
services depends not only upon the personal incomes members earn, but also on the taxation and the 
spending of government.  
Just as shifting of the tax burden implies that the statutory incidence of taxation might be quite different 
from the actual or economic incidence, public expenditure also can have unintended consequences, e.g. 
means tested welfare transfers may affect decisions on labour force participation, consumption, household 
formation (marriage), and perhaps sometimes even fertility. Most incidence studies really only consider the 
static or statutory effects of the budget and not the dynamic effects or the effects of previous rounds of 
taxation or spending. De Wulf (1975:75) warns against the impression of preciseness left by incidence studies 
and points out that such estimates can at best be approximations. 
Under apartheid, the division of service delivery into racially-based departments made it relatively easy to 
determine the financial costs of the services provided for different race groups, though it was not possible to 
determine how the benefits from a particular service differed among consumers in terms of where they are 
located and the quality of the service provided. A particularly intractable problem in apartheid South Africa 
was how to deal with wage differences amongst providers of services. As black teachers and health workers 
were paid less than their white counterparts, financial costs exaggerated differentials in actual service 
provision by race. No adjustment was made for this in the incidence studies discussed here. 
 
5.1 Seventy years of fiscal incidence studies in South Africa 
The first fiscal incidence study in South Africa dates back almost seventy years, when the Native Economics 
Commission concluded that expenditures (both directly assignable to individuals, such as social services, and 
an imputed value for non-assignable expenditures) of R8.3m to the benefit of Africans in 1929/30 well 
exceeded the R6.6m they paid in taxes (South Africa 1932: 170-178).  
In the 1950s the Tomlinson Commission (South Africa 1955), in drawing up the blueprint for the 
homeland policy, concluded that in 1951 Africans benefited from social services of R50.3m plus a share of 
R32.4m in non-assignable services. This contrasted with direct taxes of R4.0m and another R15.4m in other 
taxes, leaving a net transfer of R63.3m to Africans through the budget (calculated from South Africa 1955: 
38). If, however, only the contribution to secondary income is considered, from the total African income of 
somewhat more than R400m, R4.0m of direct taxes was subtracted, and they received directly assignable 
social services valued at R50.3m, leaving them about 11 per cent better off after the budget than before.  
In 1971 Spandau showed that whites bore more than 90% of the direct tax burden in 1959/60, but that 
racial gaps in per capita disposable income nevertheless remained large. Even then, inequality within the 
African population was already startlingly large: the ratio between the per capita disposable income of African 
urban and African rural inhabitants, at 4.7 : 1, was almost as large as that between white and African urban 
dwellers (5.0 : 1). 
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Table 7: Personal income, direct taxes and disposable income by race, 1959/60 
 Whites Africans Coloureds Indians Total 
Personal income R2 730.5m R865.5 R213.7 R75.9m R3 885.6m 
Minus: Direct taxes R143.0m R8.0m R1.7m R2.0m R154.7m 
Disposable income R2 587.6m R857.5m R212.1m R73.8m R3 730.9m 
Per capita disposable income: 
Total R838 R79 R141 R155 R234 
Urban R848 R169 R173 R173 .. 
Rural R788 R36 R71 R66 .. 
 Source: Based on Spandau 1971: Vol.II, pp.146-7 
 
Leistner’s estimates spanning four decades supported the conclusion of the Tomlinson Commission that 
African social expenditure benefits in the post-Second World War period far exceeded their contribution to 
taxes, even including indirect taxes (Table 8). Note also, however, that this had not always been the case, and 
that African social spending increased far more over the period covered by this table than other magnitudes 
shown. 
 
Table 8: Fiscal incidence for the African population, various years 
 1929/30 1946/7 1956/7 1964/5 
Direct taxes R3.0m R4.5m R7.6m R9.5m 
Indirect taxes R3.5m R8.9m R14.9m R28.5m 
Total taxes R6.5m R13.4m R22.5m R38.0m 
Admin spending* R1.4m R6.4m R24.4m R39.9m 
Social spending  R2.5m R22.6m R78.6m R146.2m 
Capital expenditures R0.4m R1.4m R22.2m R29.1m 
Total expenditures R4.3m R30.4m R125.2m R215.2m 
* This presumably refers only to "African administration", i.e. of the former homelands and townships and of the 
departments dealing with Africans 
Source: Leistner 1968: p.175 
 
In the 1970s, the Theron Commission on the socio-political position of the coloured population concluded 
that coloureds benefited substantially from budgetary redistribution (South Africa 1976: 56). Terreblanche 
(1978: Tables 1-7 & appendix) supplemented and updated these figures and pointed to a major shift favouring 
coloureds in the 1970s, mainly as a result of a dramatic expansion of social spending.  
McGrath (1983) utilised survey data along with census results for his income distribution estimates, though 
his expenditure incidence estimates were mainly based on data obtained from the expenditure authorities. 
Apartheid bookkeeping allowed most expenditures on education, health, housing and welfare, and even food 
subsidies to be allocated to individuals by race. McGrath combined this with various assumptions about non-
assignable expenditures and concluded that Africans gained under all sets of assumptions and that 
redistribution from whites increased under all but the most restrictive assumptions. Nevertheless, a massive 
post-budget racial gap remained in command over resources. 
Bromberger (1982) considered shifts in the underlying policies to derive conclusions on the evolution of 
government’s distributional stance. Pertinent to this paper is his view that the retrogression in distributive 
policies after the National Party came to power in 1948 was reduced in the 1960s, when there were already 
“signs of a thaw”, and particularly since 1972, which witnessed "a trend towards re-incorporation and reduced 
inequality".  
Van der Berg (1989) contrasted the apartheid norm for public expenditure (tax shares) with the unitary 
society norm (equity, approximated by population shares) and showed that actual expenditures lay 
somewhere between these two norms. He also showed (Van der Berg 1992a & 1992b) that the per capita 
social expenditure gap was so large that it would have been fiscally impossible to achieve parity at white 
benefit levels; in 1986 white benefit levels would have had to be reduced to about one-third their actual level 
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to achieve parity within the constraints of the budget. An IMF study (Lachman and Bercuson 1992) arrived at 
a similar conclusion and also made a strong case for policies supportive of accelerated growth to enhance 
fiscal resources, as available resources could not meet expectations in a simple static redistributive exercise. 
Janish (1996) replicated McGrath’s earlier work, but determined social service utilisation from the 1993 
Living Standards and Development Survey (PSLSD), and applied unit costs by race and/or region from public 
expenditure data to these. Her results showed that the 1993 budget was much more redistributory to blacks 
than the budgets covered by McGrath, indicating significant shifts in social spending towards blacks over the 
last two decades of apartheid. 
 
5.2 Trends in expenditure incidence 
Combining some of the foregoing studies, it is possible to deduce broad patterns of social expenditure for 
various years after World War II. The results, summarised in Table 9, show that the narrowing gap was made 
possible partly by reduced white benefit levels after 1975. The remaining gap is accounted for not so much by 
differential benefit levels as by differential access to services. 
 
Table 9: Estimates of real per capita social spending by race group in 1990-Rand, 1949-1993 (in 1990-Rand) 
 White Black Coloured Indian All groups 
1949 R 978 R 120 R 413 R 348 R 315 
1959 R1 250 R 152 R 511 R 457 R 391 
1969 R1 511 R 163 R 598 R 696 R 450 
1975 R2 033 R 239 R 804 R 891 R 607 
1986 R1 792 R 375 R 969 R1 127 R 647 
1990 R1 856 R 513 R1 074 R1 309 R 761 
1993 R1 475 R 751 R1 022 R1 488 R1 062 
Source: Own estimates based on McGrath 1983, Van der Berg 1992a & 1992b, Lachman & Bercuson 1994, and 
Janisch 1996 
 
As a result of these shifts, African social expenditure per capita, stagnant at about 12% of white levels till 
1975, increased to 51% by 1993. Together with rapidly rising social expenditure ratios, this meant that real 
social spending for Africans grew at 6.5% per annum from 1975 to 1993, in a period of sluggish economic 
growth and before apartheid had been officially abandoned. Thus when the new government assumed power 
in 1994, this trend of reducing racial disparities in social expenditure was already well established, even 
though the disparities were still large.  
In education, half the social budget, educational spending on Africans, starting from a low base, increased 
remarkably as more children entered schools, those in school remained there longer, and expenditures per 
pupil rose. As recently as 1982 spending on African education was less than half that on whites; five years 
later it had surpassed that on whites for the first time. If educational expenditure is expressed per potential 
student at all levels of education, taken to be the population aged 5-24, expenditure on Africans stood at 4% 
of that on whites in 1975, but increased substantially to 18% by 1991 (De Villiers 1996). This still left a very 
large gap, not all of it due to continued discrimination in education provision. To a large degree it also 
reflected past backlogs, which had prevented many blacks from reaching higher levels of education. But for 
the new government, it still leaves a considerable fiscal challenge to eliminate these backlogs. 
 
5.3 The redistributory impact of the budget 
All studies reviewed agree that the budget has been an instrument of limited redistribution to Africans at least 
from the late 1920s. The high degree of income inequality amongst races led to whites paying by far the 
largest share of taxes. Even under apartheid, part of these taxes was used to provide services to Africans. Thus 
post-fiscal distribution by race has long been more equal than the primary distribution of income, even though 
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the patterns of expenditure were still highly discriminatory and large post-budget racial welfare differentials 
remained. 
Surprisingly, racial redistribution through the budget actually increased even during the apartheid years. 
Fiscal redistribution before the 1930s seems to have been negligible or even regressive across races, but since 
then rising social spending on Africans had ensured greater redistribution through the budget. This 
accelerated particularly during the 1970s, with the growing needs of integration into a single economy.  
Limited scope remains to use the budget to meet the high expectations of the newly enfranchised poor. 
The major fiscal challenge now is to improve the efficiency of public resource use so as to enhance the quality 
of and access to services. Redistribution, on the other hand, will increasingly have to occur in terms of primary 
or personal incomes; a pre-condition for this is the creation of employment to draw the poor into the 
economic mainstream. 
Table 10 shows the effect of budgetary redistribution on welfare by race group in 1993. Before the 
redistributive effect of the budget is considered, per capita income of Africans (excluding social pensions, 
which are part of social spending) was only 10.3% of white levels. After the budget, African secondary 
income per capita was 15.6% of white levels, due to a net gain from fiscal incidence of R895 per African 
person and a net loss of R3 421 per white person - more than African per capita income before the budget. 
Thus even though the budget redistributed considerably, the racial post-budget gap remained extremely large. 
The scope for further redistribution through the budget is rather limited. The government’s macro-
economic strategy, GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution), acknowledges that taxation is already too 
high; if anything, taxes on the middle income group, including most whites, may be reduced to eliminate the 
effect of past fiscal drag in an inflationary environment. Political resistance by the affluent, limited capacity to 
deliver especially rural services by government, and the fact that unequal access to higher levels of education 
cannot be overcome overnight make parity in social spending per capita at best a distant goal. But even this 
would have a limited effect, as Table 10 shows: African post-budget command over goods and services, i.e. 
secondary incomes, would then still have been only 17% of white levels. This emphasises the limits to the 
budget as instrument of redistribution and points to the importance of the distribution of pre-budgetary or 
primary income. This is a key finding that reinforces our earlier conclusion that the labour market must take 
centre stage, as is indeed the case in this research project. 
 
Table 10: Racial redistribution through the budget, 1993, and limits to such redistribution 
 White African Coloured Indian Average 
Income per capita  
(excl. social pension)  
 
R26 850 
 
R2 758 
 
R5 088 
 
R10 921 
 
R6 305 
% of white level 100.0% 10.3% 18.9% 40.7% 23.5% 
Minus: Income tax per capita R5 546 R187 R500 R1 320 R941 
Disposable income per capita R21 304 R2 571 R4 588 R9 601 R5 364 
Plus: Social spending per capita R2 125 R1 082 R1 473 R2 144 R1 278 
Secondary income per capita:      
Actual 1993 R23 429 R3 653 R6 061 R11 745 R6 642 
% of white level 100.0% 15.6% 25.9% 50.1% 28.3% 
Assuming equal social 
spending of R1 278 p.c. 
 
R22 582 
 
R3 849 
 
R5 866 
 
R10 879 
 
R6 642 
% of white level 100.0% 17.0% 26.0% 48.2% 29.4% 
Per capita effect of budget:      
Actual 1993  -R3 421 R895 R973 R824 R337 
Assuming equal social 
spending of R1 278 p.c. 
 
-R4 268 
 
R1 091 
 
R778 
 
-R42 
 
R337 
Scope for redistribution -R847 +R196 -R195 -R966 R0 
Source: Own recalculations based on Janisch (1996). 
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6. The Current Economic Policy Environment in South Africa 
One of the consequences of such inequality in a developing country context is also endemic poverty. Four 
well-known investigations have been undertaken into aspects of South African poverty. The Carnegie 
Investigation considered the poor-white problem in the 1930s (cf. Le Roux 1978); the Tomlinson Commission 
looked at the economic situation within what later became known as the homelands in the 1950s; in the 
1970s the Theron Commission investigated poverty amongst coloured people (cf. Terreblanche 1976); and 
the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in the early 1980s looked at particularly African 
poverty (Wilson & Ramphele 1990). The Tomlinson Commission was unique in that its brief was to investigate 
ways of improving the economic situation within particular areas; for this reason, it is not fully comparable 
with the other investigations, as industrial decentralisation, for instance, played a large role in its findings. The 
other three investigations had some common features: they all saw an active role for the state in redressing 
poverty; all placed particular emphasis on education; and all perceived employment creation as necessary, 
but not sufficient unless accompanied by social upliftment on a large scale and over a substantial time period. 
But crucially, all three reports and the debate flowing from them emphasised the importance of political 
structures which would ensure that the problem of poverty cannot be ignored. 
The (First) Carnegie Report’s recommendations were largely put into effect, and white poverty was largely 
eliminated within a generation. The state in the process reduced economic disparities between Afrikaners and 
English-speaking whites. Poverty amongst coloureds has also been addressed with some (although more 
limited) success in the quarter century since the Theron Commission. The Second Carnegie Inquiry had no 
direct impact on policy as it had no official standing. As African poverty is far more intractable than poverty 
amongst other groups, and the fiscal constraint on addressing such poverty is far more severe, one would 
expect the results of attention to African poverty to be less dramatic in anything but the long term. 
In 1996, the government accepted a new macro-economic strategy, known as GEAR (Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution). It saw substantial long term economic growth rates as achievable, given 
improvements in education, the freeing of international trade, and possible long term capital flows to South 
Africa in the absence of apartheid. GEAR aimed at building a bridge towards such long term growth by 
establishing a medium term growth record that would attract foreign investors and raise the balance of 
payments constraint. To that end, it essentially involved an export-led policy, stimulated by the real exchange 
rate decline of early 1996. This was regarded as an opportunity to stimulate exports, if the inflationary 
consequences of depreciation could be staved off by anti-inflationary policies, including fiscal restraint, 
continued tight monetary policies, and wage restraint. All three these aspects, but particularly the last, were 
opposed by the ANC’s allies in the trade unions and the South African Communist Party.  
A series of labour reforms introduced since the ANC came to power in 1994 received support from 
organised workers, but were perceived in the investor community as being in conflict with the spirit of GEAR 
because of the increased labour market regulation they embodied. These reforms included the Labour 
Relations Act (LRA) of 1995, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997, he Employment Equity Act of 
1998, and the Skills Development Bill, still not passed by Parliament. 
In 1998, a Poverty and Inequality Report (PIR), a study undertaken by a number of researchers on behalf 
of government, was made public. Its impact on policy has been limited, but that it was undertaken at all 
shows government’s growing concern with poverty and unemployment. This concern also led to a Job 
Summit at the end of 1998 between government, organised labour and the business sector. The major 
consensus issue to emerge from this was on occupational training and the need for job creation schemes, but 
details remained vague. Government also used this opportunity to reiterate its position on GEAR as the 
central part of its economic strategy. This was seen as an indication that the government was becoming 
impatient with the labour movement and was willing to reconsider some of its labour policies for fear that 
they were inimical to employment creation.  
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7. Contemporary household poverty and the labour market  
The concern with poverty reflected in policy developments of recent years relates to the fact that poverty has 
not declined with the eradication of discrimination in the labour market, as will become clear in this Section. 
This Section provides a brief overview of the present situation regarding poverty, material welfare and 
inequality in households and of inequality in the labour market, mainly at the racial level, although the role of 
other markers of inequality such as gender, location, occupation, and formal/informal status will also be 
discussed. This will serve as an introduction to other parts of this research project, which will go into further 
detail on these topics, and also provides a current perspective against which to judge the historical trends 
discussed earlier.  
 
7.1 Racial distribution of material welfare 
Table 11 presents a few differentials in living standards and privilege between races in South Africa in 
summary form. The fullest measure of economic and social inequality is the estimated differential of 13 years 
in average life expectancy at birth between whites and Africans, a measure sensitive to nutrition, health, 
education, sanitation, and housing conditions and that thus goes beyond the usual income poverty measures. 
  
Table 11: Some measures of racial inequality in the 1990s 
  White African Coloured Indian Total 
Per capita income 1995 R34 689 R2 717 R6 931 R16 793 R7 062 
% of households poor 1995 0.4% 38.8% 19.0% 2.3% 28.4% 
Monthly non-agric. wage Dec1997 R7 243 R2 711 R3 053 R4 300 R4 121 
Broad unemployment 1995 35% 4% 21% 12% 27% 
Social spending per capita 1993 R2 125 R1 082 R1 473 R2 144 R1 530 
% matriculated (age 25+)  1995 68% 19% 18% 44% 28% 
Life expectancy at birth 1991 73 60 66 69 63 
Sources: Other tables in this paper; Central Statistical Service 
 
Table 12 shows the economic position of the different quintiles of the household income distribution in 1993. 
Although household poverty is not purely a labour market phenomenon, and the mapping of earners onto 
households is inherently difficult (many households, for instance, have earners involved in different sectors or 
in different occupations), it has clearly been shown above that the labour market is a crucial element in 
household poverty in South Africa.  
A broad picture emerges of an affluent top quintile being joined by increasing numbers of Africans (a 
process that undoubtedly accelerated after democratisation); a second quintile that is mainly African, earners 
being relatively well-established in mainly urban jobs, economically relatively secure, and strongly upwardly 
mobile; a third quintile whose economic position is tenuous as earners depend on highly uncertain jobs and 
have limited social security coverage; and two bottom quintiles who are poor, largely rural and excluded from 
most of the benefits of the modern consumer economy and labour market. For the bottom 60% of 
households, the state's transfer payments are crucial, as social assistance to the old and the disabled has come 
to play a unique role in South African poverty alleviation. But in other areas, the social spending shifts of the 
past two decades resulted in a trend to service provision to the top quintiles of all race groups. For instance, 
the table shows that in 1993 the better educated were mainly concentrated in the top two quintiles, while 
secondary and tertiary educational enrolment was also concentrated in these quintiles. The bottom three 
quintiles, which included many children, had extremely poor access to secondary and tertiary education. Thus 
THE PRESENT AS A LEGACY OF THE PAST: THE LABOUR MARKET, INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN SA 
 
 
 
  
 
21 
 
 
the income classes were recreating themselves. But the major difference between the bottom quintiles and 
the rest was access to very scarce remunerative employment.5 
 
Table 12: Socio-economic situation of different income classes, 1993* 
 Income quintiles  
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5: 
 
Total 
Per capita income R390 R1 056 R1 974  R4 158 R20 478 R5 611 
Household income R2 406 R6 372 R11 550 R22 458 R82 536 R30 630 
Remittances as % of income  27% 14% 6% 2% 1% 3% 
Regular wage as % of income 23% 44% 67% 79% 65% 65% 
Unemployment 53% 43% 30% 17% 4% 30% 
No education** 24% 18% 13% 7% 6% 15% 
Less than full primary educ.** 54% 42% 33% 21% 9% 35% 
Completed secondary educ.** 4% 8% 13% 23% 62% 19% 
Completed tertiary educ.** 0% 0% 0.2% 0.6% 10.3% 1.8% 
Primary net enrolment 85% 87% 88% 89% 90% 87% 
Secondary net enrolment 46% 57% 67% 78% 83% 60% 
Tertiary net enrolment 4% 5% 8% 20% 38% 11% 
Households rural 76% 68% 46% 33% 15% 47% 
Households metropolitan 10% 14% 29% 40% 58% 30% 
Households African 96% 93% 82% 68% 25% 73% 
Households white 1% 1% 3% 16% 66% 17% 
Household size 6.3 6.0 5.9 5.4 4.2 5.5 
Shacks/traditional dwellings 39% 32% 25% 15% 2% 23% 
Electricity in home 15% 28% 49% 77% 98% 53% 
Stunting of children under 5 38% 27% 23% 18% 6% 27% 
* Figures are taken from different sources that are not necessarily fully comparable across different dimensions, as the criteria for 
the division into quintiles were not always the same (e.g. income or consumption group, quintile of households or of individuals, 
etc.) 
** Education level obtained calculated only for population 16 years and older 
Sources: Compiled from World Bank/RDP 1995; Saldru 1994; Janisch 1996; Klasen 1996. 
 
7.2 Household poverty  
Table 13 below employs a household poverty line of R903 per month to determine the incidence of poverty. 
A first, basic national poverty measure is provided in column 4, where the incidence of poverty for all 
households is 28.4%. This is simply a headcount index, measuring the number of households earning less than 
the poverty line. There is a disproportionately high incidence of poverty amongst African households (39%) 
and to a lesser extent amongst coloureds (19%) compared with Asian and White households.  
Close to half (48%) of rural households earn a monthly income below the poverty line, but the 
corresponding figure for urban areas is only 13%. Poverty is most endemic in the Eastern Cape, Free State 
and Northern Province, while the lowest incidence of household poverty is in Gauteng and the Western 
Cape. While Kwazulu-Natal has a relatively low poverty incidence, its large population size means that it 
houses a large proportion (17%) of the poor. 6 
 
                                                             
5 For a fuller treatment of poverty, social security and social service provision in the post-apartheid period, cf. 
World Bank/RDP (1995), Klasen (1996), Bhorat & Leibbrandt (1996), Lundahl & Moritz (1994), Leibbrandt et al. 
(1996), Saldru (1994), South Africa (1996), Kruger (1992), Lund (1993), Van der Berg (1997), Case & Deaton 
(1996), Whiteford et al. (1995), Whiteford & McGrath (1994), Donaldson (1992 & 1993), and PIR 1998. A 
historical perspective is best gained from Bromberger (1984), Iliffe (1987), Kruger (1992),  and Wilson & 
Ramphele (1985).  
6 The slightly lower poverty figures for the Northern Province compared to those reported when using the 1993 
data from the Living Standards and Development Survey suggest an overstatement of poverty in this province in 
the past (Leibbrandt & Woolard 1999). 
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Table 13: A profile of household poverty, 1995 
 % of all 
households 
% of poor 
households 
% of non-poor 
households 
Incidence of 
poverty (5) 
Relative 
incidence of 
poverty 
     (2)/(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All Households 100.0%   28.4%  
Race      
African 68.7% 93.7% 58.7% 38.8% 1.37 
Coloured 8.6% 5.8% 9.8% 19.0% 0.67 
Asian 2.8% 0.2% 3.9% 2.3% 0.08 
White 19.9% 0.3% 27.6% 0.4% 0.01 
Location 
Urban 56.2% 26.5% 68.0% 13.4% 0.47 
Rural 43.8% 73.5% 32.0% 47.7% 1.68 
Province 
Western Cape 10.9% 3.9% 13.6% 10.3% 0.36 
Eastern Cape 14.9% 25.8% 10.5% 49.3% 1.73 
Northern Cape 2.1% 2.3% 2.1% 30.0% 1.06 
Free State 8.1% 12.1% 6.5% 42.4% 1.49 
Kwazulu/Natal 18.0% 16.7% 18.6% 26.3% 0.93 
North-West 8.6% 10.8% 7.8% 35.5% 1.25 
Gauteng 19.8% 4.4% 26.0% 6.3% 0.22 
Mpumalanga 6.3% 8.4% 5.5% 37.5% 1.32 
Northern Province 11.2% 15.7% 9.4% 39.9% 1.40 
Household size 
1 12.9% 2.2% 17.1% 4.9% 0.17 
2 15.4% 7.9% 18.3% 14.6% 0.51 
3 14.2% 11.2% 15.4% 22.4% 0.79 
4 17.8% 16.6% 18.3% 26.5% 0.93 
5 13.6% 16.3% 12.6% 34.0% 1.20 
6 9.9% 15.0% 7.8% 43.4% 1.53 
7 6.3% 10.9% 4.4% 49.6% 1.75 
8 4.0% 7.6% 2.6% 53.6% 1.89 
9 2.7% 5.5% 1.6% 57.3% 2.02 
10+ 3.2% 6.7% 1.8% 59.4% 2.09 
No. of Children under 16 
0 38.5% 19.3% 46.1% 14.2% 0.50 
1 19.3% 19.5% 19.3% 28.7% 1.01 
2 19.2% 21.4% 18.4% 31.6% 1.11 
3 12.0% 17.6% 9.8% 41.7% 1.47 
4 6.6% 12.4% 4.3% 53.3% 1.88 
5 2.9% 6.2% 1.5% 61.4% 2.16 
6+ 1.5% 3.6% 0.6% 70.2% 2.47 
Average Age of Adults 
16-24 4.3% 5.3% 4.0% 34.4% 1.21 
25-29 14.5% 15.4% 14.2% 30.2% 1.06 
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30-40 44.0% 45.1% 43.5% 29.2% 1.03 
Over 40 37.2% 34.2% 38.4% 26.2% 0.92 
Average Years of Education of Adults 
0-3 11.6% 20.6% 8.0% 50.6% 1.78 
4-7 27.9% 48.3% 19.8% 49.2% 1.73 
8-11 39.0% 29.7% 42.7% 21.6% 0.76 
12 11.4% 0.9% 15.5% 2.1% 0.08 
12+ 9.8% 0.1% 13.7% 0.3% 0.01 
Male Head or Married Male Present 
Yes 72.0% 59.7% 76.9% 23.6% 0.83 
No 28.0% 40.3% 23.1% 40.9% 1.44 
Number of Earners 
0 28.4% 52.2% 19.0% 52.2% 1.84 
1 43.4% 33.4% 47.4% 21.9% 0.77 
2 23.2% 12.4% 27.5% 15.2% 0.53 
3 5.0% 2.0% 6.2% 11.6% 0.41 
Unemployment Rate of Adults 
0% to 25% 57.2% 31.3% 67.5% 15.5% 0.55 
25% to 50% 2.7% 2.1% 3.0% 22.4% 0.79 
50% to 75% 10.8% 12.7% 10.0% 33.5% 1.18 
75% to 100% 29.3% 53.9% 19.5% 52.3% 1.84 
Source: Own calculations from OHS/IES95 
 
Household size clearly is related to poverty where the latter is defined in per capita terms. Households with 
fewer than five members have a smaller share of the poor than of the overall population, while larger 
households are more likely to be poor. This is supported by the data that show that the incidence of poverty 
rises with the number of children. 
Poverty is more concentrated in households where the average adult age within households is below 24 
years (adults being defined here as 16 years or older), 34% of such households being poor. This may in part 
reflect a labour market life cycle phenomenon: younger households have lower levels of experience and 
fewer years of schooling, and therefore earn less, or are less likely to be in employment. Fortunately, though, 
such households are also usually smaller, thus their population share may also be smaller. 
In more than two-thirds of poor households, average adult education levels are below secondary level (i.e. 
less than 8 years of education). Secondary schooling, especially when completed, is apparently able to pull 
households above the poverty line, as the incidence of poverty among households where adults have 
matriculated is only 2.1%, and amongst those with even higher education it is only 0.3%. The relative 
incidence of poverty (last column) indicates that the dividing line in terms of education and household 
poverty is the attainment or non-attainment of at least secondary education.  
The presence of a married male or male head in the household would appear to be an important 
predictor of poverty. Hence, amongst the 28% of all households with no male head or married male present, 
the incidence of poverty is 41%, as against only 24% in all other households. This should be seen against the 
perspective of widespread male absence from rural areas due to migrant work  
As would be expected, the addition of one more earner (employed or self-employed) in a household 
reduces the likelihood of living in poverty. Thus while households with no earners are 28% of all households, 
they constitute more than half of poor households. Note that the largest drop in poverty incidence occurs 
upon the provision of one job to a household with no earners. Even among households with one earner there 
are still many (22%) in poverty, though, i.e. the level of income earned from employment or self-employment 
is still insufficient to lift these households out of poverty. Thus the quality of employment is also important.  
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The final rows of the table show that, where less than one-quarter of adults are unemployed in a 
household, the poverty incidence is particularly low (16%). At higher household unemployment rates, poverty 
becomes more pervasive.  
 
7.3. A labour market snapshot 
Table 14, loosely based on Fallon & Lucas (1996) though using a different data set, presents a broad snapshot 
of the South African labour market. A slight majority of the total population of working age of 23.9 million is 
female. Looking first at male workers, a greater share of white (78%) than African (47%) male workers is in 
employment. Across all race groups, formal employment (designated as ‘employee’) dominates as the main 
form of work activity. The share of African working-age males in unemployment is 18%, with coloured males 
not far better off with 13%, much higher than the 2% of white male workers. (Note that these figures refer to 
broad unemployment, and are expressed relative to the total population of working age rather than to the 
labour force. They thus differ from unemployment rates, which are discussed later.) The primary reason for 
males being economically inactive (out of the labour force) is enrolment in education. The exceptionally high 
figure for African males of 24% in part reflects the long duration and poor efficiency (in terms of pass-rates) of 
the education system. 
 
Gender differences in the labour market are stark. While 43% of all African males of working age are 
formal employees, only 17% of African females are in the same position. There are three different 
explanations for this. Firstly, more African females than African males are in self-employment or domestic 
service. Secondly, the share of African females in unemployment is also higher. Thirdly, a larger proportion of 
African females are out of the labour force, the majority being enrolled in education or involved in household 
duties. It is interesting to note that the education figures are more differentiated according to race than 
gender. 
Amongst female workers, there are also racial differences. While only 17% of African females are in formal 
employment, 45% of white females and 36% of coloured females have formal jobs. Amongst Asians, the 
relatively low figure of 30% is accounted for by a large proportion (34%) being outside the labour force 
through involvement in household duties. Note also that 8% of coloured women are in unregistered self-
employment, reflecting also their involvement in domestic services. But African women are the least likely 
amongst all workers to have employment. 
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 Table 14: Employment status of adults (age 16+) by race and gender, 1995 
Males Females  
African White Coloured Asian African White Coloured Asian 
Total 
Population 16 years or older 8 424 476 1 796 299 1 098 972 343 145 9 016 475 1 748 318 1 161 714 352 004 23 941 403 
Employees* 43% 63% 60% 59% 17% 45% 36% 30% 35% 
Registered self-employed 0% 11% 1% 8% 0% 3% 0% 1% 1% 
Unregistered self-employed 2% 2% 2% 5% 8% 2% 8% 2% 5% 
Employees and self-employed (hybrid)  
1% 
 
2% 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
1% 
Total employed 47% 78% 64% 73% 26% 52% 44% 34% 43% 
Unemployed & searching 9% 2% 10% 6% 9% 2% 9% 5% 8% 
Unemployed & not searching 9% 0% 4% 1% 12% 1% 6% 3% 8% 
Total unemployed 18% 2% 13% 7% 21% 3% 15% 7% 16% 
Enrolled in education 24% 10% 11% 11% 22% 9% 9% 11% 20% 
Keeping house 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 21% 16% 34% 8% 
Retired 3% 8% 3% 3% 5% 8% 4% 4% 4% 
Disabled 3% 2% 7% 3% 2% 1% 4% 3% 3% 
Other 6% 1% 3% 2% 11% 6% 8% 7% 7% 
Total out of labour force 36% 20% 24% 20% 53% 45% 41% 59% 42% 
Unemployment rate (% of Labour Force): 
Broad 28% 3% 17% 9% 45% 6% 26% 18% 27% 
Narrow 13% 2% 12% 8% 19% 4% 16% 11% 13% 
* Domestic workers not included with employees, but with self-employed 
Totals do not all add up to 100% due to rounding 
Source: Own calculations from OHS95 
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Unemployment rates are presented at the bottom of the table, according to both the strict and expanded 
definitions. Race and gender are very important determinants of unemployment. African unemployment rates 
are higher than for all other race groups, while the coloured unemployment rates are also fairly high. The 
gender effect is strong among all race groups, female broad unemployment levels being almost double that of 
their male counterparts. Differentials are smaller (though still large) when the narrow unemployment rate is 
considered, indicative of the preponderance of women among discouraged work seekers. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has shown that poverty and inequality are still widespread in South Africa, and that it mainly has its 
origins in the labour market. Solutions to these problems would also have to be found in the labour market. 
An understanding of labour market outcomes is thus essential for understanding contemporary household 
poverty in South Africa. This, in turn, cannot be done in isolation from the historical forces that have shaped 
the South African labour market, as discussed in this paper. Poverty and inequality in the present are very 
much the legacy of South Africa’s discriminatory past. 
This paper serves as an introduction to the wider research project on poverty and the labour market in 
South Africa. The rest of this research project will provide a detailed analysis of contemporary poverty and 
inequality dynamics within households and within the labour market. The final research report will then 
combine this contemporary analysis with the historical backdrop in order to arrive at some policy conclusions. 
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